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Abstract 
 
This article explores the challenges of digital constitutionalism in practice through a 
case study examining how concepts of privacy and security have been framed and 
contested in Australian cyber security and telecommunications policy-making over 
the last decade. The Australian Government has formally committed to ‘Internet 
freedom’ norms, including privacy, through membership of the Freedom Online 
Coalition. Importantly, however, this commitment is non-binding and designed 
primarily to guide the development of policy by legislators and the executive 
government. Through this analysis, we seek to understand if, and how, principles of 
digital constitutionalism have been incorporated at the national level. Our analysis 
suggests a fundamental challenge for the project of digital constitutionalism in 
developing and implementing principles that have practical or legally binding impact 
on domestic telecommunications and cyber security policy. Australia is the only 
major Western liberal democracy without constitutional human rights or a legislated 
bill of rights at the federal level; this means that the task of ‘balancing’ what are 
conceived as competing rights is left only to the legislature. Our analysis shows that 
despite high-level commitments to privacy as per the Freedom of Online Coalition, 
individual rights are routinely discounted against collective rights to security. We 
conclude by arguing that, at least in Australia, the domestic conditions limit the 
practical application and enforcement of digital constitutionalism’s norms.  
 
Key words: Privacy, security, securitisation, cyber security, online surveillance, 
metadata retention, human rights, digital constitutionalism  
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Introduction 
This paper examines how formal commitments to digital constitutionalism and 
protecting the human rights of individuals in domestic policy-making are reflected in 
Australian telecommunications and cyber security policy. As a case study, we 
examine how conceptions of privacy and security are constructed in Australian 
policymaking discourses. We focus specifically on Australia due the unique domestic 
context. Despite Australia’s recent commitment to online privacy as per the Freedom 
of Online Coalition, there is an absence of constitutional protections of human rights 
and corresponding enforcement mechanisms – a scenario which may be replicated in 
a United Kingdom ‘Brexited’ from the European Union and Council of Europe 
human rights protections. Further, as a member of the Five-Eyes partnership, 
Australia has been heavily involved in global surveillance practices.  
 
Both the privacy and security interests of individuals are often promoted via 
‘digital constitutionalism’, that is the ‘constellation of initiatives that have sought to 
articulate a set of political rights, governance norms, and limitations on the exercise of 
power on the Internet’ (Gill et al., 2015: 2). Reflecting multistakeholder Internet 
governance processes (Waz and Weiser, 2013), these initiatives have emanated from 
international organisations, national governments, technology companies and civil 
society groups. Traditional, pre-digital forms of constitutionalism have generally 
sought to address exercises of power by the nation-state (Waldron, 2012), but more 
recent endeavours have sought to address the practices of private companies (often 
large and transnational entities) that provide critical Internet services, platforms and 
infrastructure (Gill et al., 2015; Suzor, 2010). In their analysis of digital 
constitutionalism policy documents, Gill et al. (2015) found that privacy rights were 
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among the three most prominent rights in these documents, with the right to personal 
security and dignity appearing less often, but still present in eight of the documents 
analysed. 
 
However, apart from the Brazilian Marco Civil1, the digital constitutionalism 
project so far has generally resulted in aspirational targets for nation-states, 
international organisations and private Internet actors, rather than enforceable rights 
in domestic legal systems (Gill et al., 2015). The Marco Civil is unique given its 
status as binding legislation from a nation-state, albeit one that ‘fleshes out rights that 
already exist in Brazil (albeit in a latent or vague form), rather than creating entirely 
new rights’ (Mendeiros and Bygrave, 2015: 121). Aside from the Marco Civil, the 
lack of domestic legal protection and corresponding enforcement mechanisms is a 
major challenge for the digital constitutionalism project. Digital constitutionalist 
declarations, like many international human rights instruments, can be difficult to 
enforce in a practical sense at the nation state level.  
 
Similar to these international human rights agreements (von Stein, 2016), and 
via an analysis of Australian policymaking processes, we argue the domestic situation 
is central to determining the extent to which law and policy reflect digital 
constitutionalist norms. Where rights are not supported by mechanisms for judicial 
enforcement, there is a risk that legislative processes may fail to adequately protect 
                                                 
1 A Magna Carta for Philippine Internet Freedom has been put before the Parliament of the 
Philippines but, at the time of writing, has not been signed into law (Robie and Abcede, 2015). 
The Italian Declaration of Internet Rights, is ‘an exclusively political document with no legal 
binding value’ (Pollicino and Bassini, 2015). The Nigerian Parliament has been considering 
legislation to enact a ‘Nigerian Digital Rights and Freedoms Bill’ (Yilma, 2017). 
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individuals’ rights. This can be seen as a limitation of the digital constitutionalism 
project in addition to the other limitations identified by Yilma (2017), namely: 
fragmentation; disjointed goals; a lack of feasibility; the Western perspective that 
many if not most of the digital constitutionalism initiative adopt; and the lack of 
engagement with the digital divide between developed and developing countries, and 
internally within countries.     
 
In order to better understand these policymaking processes and compromises 
we collected a sample of documents about the development of Australian 
telecommunications and cyber security policy across the previous decade (2007-17). 
We analysed policies developed by the Commonwealth government and its agencies 
and inquiries conducted by the Australian Parliament that were published between 
2004 and 2016. These documents are moulded by the political process and are 
representations of policy development and governance (Barnard-Wills, 2013). Using 
narrative policy analysis we traced policy development through time to identify the 
rhetoric used to justify government decision-making (Van Eeten, 2008: 251; Roe, 
1994). We examined how the notions of privacy and security as individual or 
collective rights are discursively constructed, and whether they were framed as 
competing or complementary. 
 
Digital Constitutionalism in Australia 
Australia has formally adopted some principles of digital constitutionalism, most 
prominently by joining the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) in 2015, ‘a group of 
governments who have committed to work together to support Internet freedom and 
protect fundamental human right – free expression, association, assembly, and privacy 
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online – worldwide’ (Freedom Online Coalition, n.d.). FOC members commit to the 
shared goals and values of the Tallinn Agenda, which envisages ‘respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and security online [being] complementary 
concepts’ (Freedom Online Coalition, 2014: 1). It is important to note, however, that 
despite these high-level commitments to digital rights, no enforcement mechanisms 
have been implemented in order to ensure compliance.  
 
Despite these high level commitments to digital constitutionalism, Australia is 
unique as the only Western-style liberal democracy that does not have a 
comprehensive set of human rights in its Constitution (like the US) or a legislated Bill 
of Rights (like neighbouring New Zealand) at the federal level. Of the few rights that 
do receive constitutional protection in Australia, privacy and individual security are 
not among them, and free expression receives only limited protection via the implied 
right to political communication (Nicholls, 2012; Pearson, 2012). At the state and 
territory level in Australia, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the State of 
Victoria both have human rights legislation which introduces individual rights 
including privacy and personal security.2 However the enforcement mechanisms for 
these bills of rights are weak: courts cannot invalidate laws for a lack of compliance 
with the enumerated rights (Williams, 2006). The lack of enforceable protections 
leaves many groups vulnerable to human rights violations and without any means of 
redress (Otto and Wiseman, 2001). There are various areas of current concern where 
the Australian government may be violating international human rights standards, 
                                                 
2 At the time of writing a legislated Bill of Rights is under consideration in the state of Queensland 
(Williams and Reynolds, 2016).  
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particularly in regard to refugees (Saul, 2012; Henderson, 2014),3 and Indigenous/ 
First Nations peoples (Bielefield and Altman, 2015).  
 
In recent years, the Australian government’s surveillance of communications 
has been a key area of concern for the protection of human rights, specifically 
privacy. Australia has been heavily involved in global surveillance practices as one of 
the Five Eyes partners (along with the US, UK, New Zealand and Canada) exposed in 
the Snowden revelations (Ruby, 2015). While Australians enjoy some personal data 
protection in domestic law via the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth),4 this legislation contains 
considerable exemptions for law enforcement agencies, including complete 
exemption for federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Greenleaf, 2001; 
Molnar and Parsons, 2016; Mann and Smith, 2017). These exemptions have the 
practical effect of trading off individual rights for community interests in security 
(Bronitt and Stellios, 2005). The Privacy Act also did not prevent data retention 
legislation (based on the now-invalidated EU Data Retention Directive) being 
introduced (Daly, 2016). This situation can be understood as an example of ‘counter-
law’ (Ericson, 2007) legally facilitating blanket surveillance of the Australian 
population.  
 
Through these examples it is evident that Australia’s commitment to protect 
individual privacy, as part of the Freedom Online Coalition, is not supported by any 
                                                 
3 In February 2017, a submission was made to the International Criminal Court requesting that the 
ICC investigate possible crimes against humanity as regards Australia’s offshore asylum seeker 
detention regime (Doherty, 2017). 
4 This realizes Australia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976). 
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real legal enforcement mechanism. Without a constitutional guarantee, the task of 
protecting privacy in Australia falls to the legislative and executive branches of 
government. The judicial branch, which has proved important to upholding privacy 
interests in other Western democracies, has only a limited role in protecting human 
rights in Australia. Aside from the apparently contradictory results where individuals 
within a liberal democracy have access few effective options to uphold and enforce 
their rights via judicial mechanisms, Australia may also serve as a warning tale to 
those in the United Kingdom faced with a Brexit situation possibly involving the 
disapplication of EU law (and the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and an exit from 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Daly and Thomas, 2017). 
 
The Privacy and Security (Im)Balance? 
The balancing of security and civil rights is a ‘crucial legal conflict in the information 
society’ (Durante, 2013: 437). This regulatory ‘conundrum’ (Bagby, 2012: 1454) has 
a ‘rhetorical ring that fits the political agenda of extended law enforcement 
competences’ (Hildebrandt, 2013: 372). It has been argued that this conflict ‘explains 
much in the law enforcement, internal private security, counter-terrorism, cyber-
security and critical infrastructure protection debates’ (Bagby, 2012: 1454). However, 
the privacy-security relationship may not be a ‘balance’ but rather a ‘trade-off’ with 
the image of the scale used to justify the sacrifice of liberties (Hildebrandt, 2013). 
Policies are rationalised with the promise of security, but at the expense of other 
rights and freedoms, including privacy.  
Trading privacy for security is often used to support the introduction of new 
powers and programs of surveillance (de Zwartz et al., 2014; Lachmayer and Witzleb, 
2014) and is underpinned by an assumption that security can be achieved through pre-
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emptive intelligence-based identification of previously unknown threats (Zedner, 
2009; McCulloch and Pickering, 2010). It has been argued that the requirement to 
pre-emptively identify threats provides ‘ready rhetorical support’ for the ongoing 
expansion of surveillance, particularly in online contexts (Barnard-Wills, 2013: 173, 
180). Claims to collective security will always outweigh individual rights that are 
perpetually ‘traded off’ (Bronitt and Stellios, 2006). Indeed, ‘giving up a measure of 
privacy to gain a measure of security sounds reasonable to many people’ 
(Hildebrandt, 2013: 372).  
 
This privacy-security trade-off can be linked back to broader legal discussions 
of rights. Human rights are said to be incommensurable, but real-life scenarios of 
conflicting rights require some sort of balance to be struck between them, especially 
in the judicial context (McCrudden, 2008). However, there is limited guidance about 
how to attain a suitable balance between rights, or indeed, what this would represent 
in practice (Bagby, 2012). Cost-benefit analyses imply precision and quantifiable 
methods of weighting interests (Hildebrandt, 2013). Yet human rights do not lend 
themselves easily to quantification. For this reason it has been argued that this 
‘calculus is highly complex’ and simultaneously ‘overly simplistic’ (Bagby, 2012: 
1453, 1454). Some constitutional courts have adopted ‘proportionality’ analyses to 
resolve conflicts of fundamental rights (i.e. whether the restriction on a right furthers 
a legitimate aim in a rational and proportional fashion) (McCrudden, 2008). Yet these 
analyses have been criticised for constituting a misguided quest for objectivity and 
precision, where instead courts should be focusing on the moral issues underpinning 
the conflict of rights (Tsakyrakis, 2009) or engaging in more principled and pragmatic 
decision-making (De Schutter and Tulkens, 2008). In the absence of ‘determinist or 
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formulaic balancing methodology,’ political pressures may be the most significant 
influence in determining what the outcome of the balancing exercise means for policy 
(Bagby, 2012: 1453).  
 
The concepts of ‘privacy’ and ‘security’ have multiple meanings across a 
range of contexts. It has been argued that privacy should not be reduced to an 
individual interest, as it is central to the formation of relationships and the healthy 
functioning of democracy; a collective right (Bennett, 2011; Regan, 2002; Introna, 
1997). Hildebrandt (2013: 364) highlights that privacy may be considered as a social 
construct ‘determined by cultural norms and values’; privacy is contextually 
dependent. There have also been critiques of the notion of ‘security’ and particularly 
‘collective security’ or ‘national security’ as it ‘fails to address the conceptual and 
practical variations that distinguish between the essentially dissimilar interests of 
states and interests of individuals’ (Biletzki, 2013: 399). There are numerous uses and 
meanings of ‘security’, and the relationship between security and other rights is 
complex. Increasing attention is being paid to the notion of ‘personal security’ that 
relates to the protection of individual human rights such as privacy (Biletzki, 2013).  
 
We adopt the theoretical lens of securitisation which enables examination of 
the construction of threats to security, and the development of corresponding 
technologies of governance. Once an issue is ‘securitised’, it enables action to be 
taken against the threat: ‘the securitising formula is that such threats require 
exceptional measures and/or emergency action to deal with them’ (Buzan, 1997: 14). 
The state requires the existence of threats to attest to its legitimacy to govern (see 
generally Garland, 2002).  
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It has been argued that ‘what becomes defined as a privacy or security 
“problem”’ (and what is excluded from this) is a political process, conducted at least 
in part through policy texts and documents’ (Barnard-Wills, 2013: 170). Barnard-
Wills (2013) analysed policy documents from a select group of EU member states and 
the US. The main findings of this study were that national security consistently 
provided rhetorical support for the pre-emptive identification of threats to security and 
increased surveillance. However, it was also found that the EU policy documents 
advocated a position where ‘privacy’ and ‘security’ were not in direct opposition. The 
point of divergence with Australia however is the absence of comprehensive 
constitutional or enforceable human rights protections at the federal level. Therefore, 
in this paper we seek to understand how concepts of, and conflicts between, digital 
privacy and security are constructed in Australian policy-making over the last decade 
and how this interaction may influence the realisation of Australia’s recent 
commitments to FOC norms and the wider digital constitutionalism project. 
 
Results and Discussion 
In our analysis of the policy documents, five main themes emerge as regards to the 
relationship between privacy and security in Australian telecommunications and cyber 
security policy.  
 
1. Constructing Threats to Security 
In a study of the concepts of privacy and security in European policy documents it 
was found that the notion of national security has expanded ‘to include information 
security, often under the rhetoric of cyber security, critical infrastructure or 
cybercrime’ (emphasis in original) (Barnard-Wills, 2013: 174). These new ‘cyber 
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threats’ – which emerged as a result of new technology and widespread dependence 
upon it - centre and construct the protection of critical infrastructure as ‘an issue of 
economic competitiveness and prosperity as well as security’ (Barnard-Wills, 2013: 
174). Indeed, within the sample of policy documents, narratives of securitisation 
presented risks to both individual and collective security, and the broader economic 
prosperity of the Australian state. These encompassed threats to national security, 
critical infrastructure, and the community. An absence of social control and regulatory 
measures in cyberspace was emphasised; the internet, and more so online anonymity, 
is framed as a fundamental security risk. For example: 
‘As the quantity and value of electronic information has increased so too have the 
efforts of criminals and other malicious actors who have embraced the Internet as 
a more anonymous, convenient and profitable way of carrying out their activities.’ 
(Attorney-General’s Department, 2009: 2). 
 
At the same time, however, there was explicit acknowledgement that the language 
used to describe threats informs the response: 
‘The broad adoption of the term [cyber attack] has seen it often used in a 
sensationalist way - similar to 'cyber war', 'cyber terrorism' and 'cyber weapons' - 
with the term 'attack' generating an emotive response and a disproportionate sense 
of threat... and undermines the development and application of proportionate 
nation state responses.’ (Australian Cyber Security Centre, 2016: 5). 
 
This highlights how the construction of threats translates into legal and policy 
responses; threats to national security operate to justify new solutions in policy and 
practice. These include new powers of surveillance and the introduction of a 
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mandatory data retention regime (e.g. House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Communications, 2010: 2; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security [PCJIS], 2015: 3) 
 
2. Privacy and Security as Competing Rights 
The main rhetorical device that is used to justify the introduction of new laws and 
policies is balancing privacy and security. This frames the relationship between 
privacy and security as a compromise or ‘zero-sum game’ (Bagby, 2012; Hildebrandt, 
2013). In order to defend and protect against threats the policy documents show a 
need to sacrifice individual rights: 
‘Confronting and managing these risks must be balanced against the civil liberties 
of Australians, including the right to privacy, and the need to promote efficiency 
and innovation to ensure that Australia realises the full potential of the digital 
economy.’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2009: 4). 
 
Further, it was evident in the policy documents that the state considers its own role as 
sole arbitrator of which normative rights and values can be ‘trade-off’, which also 
raises questions about the function of other organs of the state, and appropriate checks 
and balances (PJCIS, 2013: 190). 
 
This eschews a range of practical considerations and questions of impact. For 
example, it is implicitly assumed that new powers of surveillance will lead to 
increased security. These arguments are presented without empirical evidence and 
operate to ‘achieve a largely illusionary public sense of security’ (Hildebrandt, 2013: 
375). This is related to broader debates that relate to evidence-based policy and the 
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political capital provided by crime and security as areas of governance (Hildebrandt 
2013: 375; Garland, 2002).  
 
3. Privacy and Security as Complementary Rights 
At other times the policy documents presented an alternate conception of the 
relationship between privacy and security as interdependent, mutually reinforcing and 
complementary. There was recognition that some degree of privacy is necessary for 
individual liberty and security, particularly in relation to the threat of cybercrime. It 
was acknowledged that the protection of personal information is necessary to guard 
against threats such as identity theft, fraud, and other forms of cybercrime: 
‘The Committee agrees that privacy protections are integral to mitigating the risks 
of cyber crime. Where personal information is well protected, the scope for 
identity theft and fraud is reduced.’ (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communications, 2010: 202). 
 
These threats are constructed as an outsider criminal threat or as a consequence of 
new technology, rather than a result of state intrusion and surveillance. A study of 
European policy documents also found threats were constructed as ‘portrayed as 
coming from information technology’ rather than from the state (Barnard-Wills, 2013: 
176). Technological determinism was also evident in Australian policy documents: 
‘Vast amount of personal information are increasingly being transmitted over the 
Internet and stored on digital devices… this growing amount of digitised personal 
information places end users at a higher risk of identity theft and fraud, and [it has 
been] argued that ensuring the privacy of end users' personal information is 
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central to the prevention of cybercrime’ (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communications, 2010: 191). 
 
4. Contradictions and Tensions in Policy Rhetoric 
In addition to the above rhetorical strategies, the analysis revealed contradictions both 
within and across policy documents. For example, there was recognition that there is a 
need to secure information through privacy-enhancing technologies and encryption, 
but that those same methods create additional risks to security. Certainly it has been 
argued that these technologies are ‘adaptable to complement’ both privacy and 
security, but do not support the ‘expectation of privacy itself, nor does any tool 
adequately impart the condition of achieving security’ (Bagby, 2012: 1458). This 
reveals how the state constructs this as a barrier to accessing information:  
‘The Government supports the use of encryption to protect sensitive personal, 
commercial and government information. However, encryption presents 
challenges for Australian law enforcement and security agencies in continuing 
to access data essential for investigations to keep all Australians safe and 
secure.’ (Australian Government, 2016: 33). 
 
These tensions and contradictions extend to the primary purpose of new law and 
enhanced surveillance powers. For example, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) stated that the primary objective of data retention 
legislation is to protect privacy: 
‘The primary objective of the current legislation governing access to 
communications is to protect the privacy of users of telecommunications’ (PJCIS, 
2013: 10). 
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This flawed and contradictory rationalisation as a consequence of conceptual 
confusion justifies the introduction of new laws, which serve to impinge on individual 
privacy rather than protect it. It supports the intrusion of state power in cyberspace 
that ultimately puts ‘individual rights, such as privacy, anonymity and freedom of 
speech, under sharp devaluating pressure’ (Taddeo, 2013: 353). 
 
5. Offsetting the Balance: Necessity, Proportionality and Safeguards 
The resolution of these ‘trade offs’ and contradictions occurred through invoking 
strategies or devices to ‘offset’ ‘losses’ in privacy. These arguments centred on the 
necessity and the proportionality of new powers and surveillance programs. 
Hildebrandt (2013: 358) has outlined a test in which powers of intrusion may be 
necessary, arguing this ‘requires a legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality, 
specificity, foreseeability and safeguards.’ Her analysis extends beyond law and also 
considers ‘purposiveness, justice and legal certainty of law in a constitutional 
democracy’ (Hildebrandt, 2013: 359). Yet in the policy documents analysed, it was 
neither explained how ‘necessity’ is measured nor what measures may be 
‘proportionate’ to. While necessity and proportionality were recurring rhetorical 
devices used to justify certain cyber security policy positions, they were just that: 
rhetoric without substance. For example: 
‘The evidence received by the committee emphasised that the right to access 
telecommunications information should only be exercised when both 
proportionate and appropriate’ (Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee, 2012: 12-13). 
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Another device that is used to ‘offset’ the ‘trade-off’ between privacy and security is 
the promise of the introduction of new and strengthened accountability structures and 
safeguards. It has been argued, ‘whenever we increase the employment of security 
measures that violate our liberties, this warrants extra safeguards to regain the 
balance’ (Hildebrant, 2013: 357). This cements the image of the scale with further 
‘balancing’ via the introduction of new and improved checks and balances as an 
interesting parallel rhetorical device: 
‘A balance must be struck between appropriate checks and balances, and the 
operational flexibility required to deliver effective law enforcement and protection 
against national security threats’ (PJC IS, 2013: 47). 
 
Yet, in practice such increased accountability structures and safeguards have either 
not been implemented, have been under-funded, or there have been attempt to 
circumvent those that have been implemented. For example, in the data retention 
scheme, a limited number of Australian government agencies were given warrantless 
access to retained data, but it emerged that agencies without such access were 
circumventing this safeguard by funnelling data requests through one of the 
authorised bodies, the Australian Federal Police, seemingly encouraged to do so by 
the Attorney-General’s Department (Sveen, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of Australian cyber security and telecommunications policy documents 
over the last decade demonstrates various aspects of the privacy-security relationship 
domestically, with implications for Australia’s commitment to, and implementation 
of, digital constitutionalism norms. 
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We found that the way in which threats are framed determines the response. 
Threats are framed in a technologically deterministic way, as coming from external 
actors and technology itself rather than the state. In order to address these threats, the 
state requires further powers, itself becoming a (unacknowledged) threat to 
individuals’ rights. In these discussions, the relationship between concepts of privacy 
and security is confused. At times, privacy ‘must’ be traded off against security in 
order to address threats, with the consequence of more invasive powers for the state. 
However when discussing cybercrime, for instance, there is recognition of the 
complementary relationship between privacy and security, but again this occurs as a 
result of external criminal threats and the narrative positions the state as protector of 
both rights. This results in little practical difference between the ‘competing’ and 
‘complementary’ approaches to privacy and security as both of these policy narratives 
lead to the same role for the state and outcomes for individual privacy. One 
consequence of this relationship between privacy and security is absurd claims in 
some cases, such as the purpose of introducing mandatory data retention being to 
protect individual privacy! 
 
There was a recognition that the rhetoric of ‘accountability’ was needed to 
justify intrusions. ‘Necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ were recurring rhetorical devices 
used to justify certain cyber security policy positions, but they were just that: rhetoric 
without substance. Empirical evidence was generally not adduced to support the 
state’s identification of threats and the necessity and proportionality of privacy-
invasive measures to address these threats. Reference is made to accountability 
measures as a means of offsetting privacy-invasive law and policy but again this was 
largely rhetorical, and even when accountability measures were introduced, 
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government practice did not always respect them. Thus, even where the language of 
digital constitutionalism is used, in the absence of legal enforceability, the rhetoric is 
largely meaningless. 
 
Our analysis shows that the development of Australian telecommunications 
and cyber security policy over the last decade has been inconsistent with digital 
constitutionalist norms of privacy and security. The historical trajectory of this policy 
has not been consistent with FOC norms. Even subsequent to Australia joining the 
FOC and making a public commitment to these norms in 2015, Australia continues to 
develop policies which are not compliant with these norms, notably the introduction 
of mandatory data retention and its ongoing implementation. In fact, since Australia 
has joined the FOC, the level of Internet freedom in the country, as measured by 
Freedom House (2015), has actually declined. Yet Australia is not alone: other FOC 
members, including the UK and US, have also fallen short of implementing FOC 
norms (Carlson, 2014; York, 2014), pointing to a discrepancy between what FOC 
members have committed to do and what they do in practice (Morgan 2016). 
 
The policy discourse around the conflict between security and privacy 
interests in Australia illuminates a fundamental challenge for the digital 
constitutionalism project. The non-binding, aspirational nature of the major digital 
rights declarations is problematic. Our case study shows how digital constitutionalist 
rights can be overridden by the internal activities of nation-states, especially in 
response to circumstances and technologies framed by the nation-state as threats. It 
should be noted that individuals in Australia are in a weaker positions compared to 
their counterparts in other non-compliant FOC countries such as the US and UK, 
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where for the moment, ‘pre-digital’ constitutional and human rights protections 
permit a means of challenging this non-compliance with privacy and security rights in 
domestic and regional courts. Thus, to be effective, digital constitutionalism also 
requires certain ‘background’ constitutional arrangements to be present if individuals 
are to be fully able to realise these rights – arrangements which are absent in 
Australia’s case.  
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